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This paper argues that endogenous restructuring processes within ﬁrms towards
analytical and interactive non-routine tasks (like problem-solving and organiza-
tional activities, respectively), triggered by advances in information and commu-
nication technologies (ICT) and rising supply of educated workers, are associated
with an increase ofwage inequalitywithin education groups.We show that thismay
be accompanied by a decline or stagnation of between-group wage dispersion. The
mechanisms proposed in this research are not only consistent with the evolution of
the distribution of wages in advanced countries, but also with the evolution of task
composition in ﬁrms and a frequently conﬁrmed complementarity between skill-
upgrading, new technologies and knowledge-based work organization.
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1 Introduction
The dramatic changes in the distribution of wages in many advanced
countries during the last few decades have stimulated an intensive debate
in economic research. Most of the literature has focussed on a rise in
wage inequality between education groups.1 Interestingly, however,
1 For a comprehensive survey of the literature on the evolution of the distri-
bution of wages and explanations related to technology changes, see Acemoglu
(2002). Other explanations focus on trade-related factors (e.g., Das, 2001; 2003)
and institutional factors (e.g., Fortin and Lemieux, 1997).
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an increase in the college premium has been largely conﬁned to the US
and UK (from the 1980s onwards until recently), whereas inequality
within education groups (sometimes referred to as residual wage
inequality) has risen substantially also in other advanced countries
(see, e.g., Fitzenberger, 1999, and Fitzenberger et al., 2001, for Ger-
many).2 Moreover, most empirical studies conclude that even for the US
the rise in within-group wage inequality accounts for more than half of
the rise in total wage inequality (e.g., Juhn et al., 1993; Gottschalk and
Smeeding, 1997; Katz and Autor, 1999).
In the ﬁrst theoretical contribution which focuses on within-group
wage inequality, Galor and Moav (2000) argue that an increase in the rate
of technological progress, by adversely affecting the relative productivity
of low-skilled labor, raises educational attainment of workers with rela-
tively low learning abilities. As a result, wage inequality within skilled
and unskilled labor increases, in addition to rising between-group
inequality. Gould et al. (2001) offer an alternative explanation for rising
residual wage inequality by arguing that increasing uncertainty in the rate
of technological change across sectors disproportionately affects the
learning requirements of unskilled labor, thereby raising demand for
education as insurance. In a similar vein, Aghion (2002) and Aghion et al.
(2002) argue that within-group wage inequality rises with the speed of
diffusion of new general purpose technologies, by showing that inequality
may arise even among (with respect to their abilities) identical workers
with different opportunities to adapt to the most recent vintages of
machines.
In contrast, this paper argues that endogenous restructuring processes
within ﬁrms towards analytical and interactive non-routine tasks (like
problem-solving and organizational activities, respectively), triggered by
advances in information and communication technologies (ICT) and
rising supply of educated workers, are associated with rising wage
inequality within education groups. Moreover, we show that, at the same
time, between-group wage dispersion may fall, as especially observed in
Continental Europe.
2 In Germany, wage dispersion within education groups has considerably in-
creased among medium-educated and high-educated workers, whereas remaining
fairly stable among the low-skilled (Fitzenberger, 1999; Fitzenberger et al.,
2001).
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Our goal is to provide a theory based on the behavioral response of
ﬁrms in adapting to changes in technology and factor supply conditions.3
The proposed framework is designed to shed light on the microeconomic
underlying forces for changes in the wage distribution within and across
education groups. The model rests on the following hypotheses. First,
reallocating production workers from routine to non-routine tasks is
productivity-enhancing, but requires a larger degree of (informal) training
by non-production workers (encompassing ‘‘support’’ and ‘‘supervision’’
tasks). For instance, this includes the regular updating of workers about
changes in work procedures, the organizational structure and employers’
goals. Second, non-routine tasks require a wider spectrum of abilities 
like analytical skills, adaptability to new environments, management
skills, the ability to communicate with coworkers (and other social skills)
 than routine tasks. For instance, autonomous decision-making and
problem-solving presumes interaction among workers, performance and
coordination of multiple tasks and the need to gather relevant information
from coworkers (e.g., Lindbeck and Snower, 1996, 2000). Moreover,
providing support and information to production workers itself requires
social skills of non-production workers. Abilities to perform these tasks
effectively are typically unobservable for empirical researchers, and are
possibly unrelated to formal education levels, thus providing a natural
ingredient for a theory of residual inequality. Third, we hypothesize that
non-production (e.g., organizational) activities are intensive in educated
labor.
The idea of the present paper is to propose a uniﬁed framework which
identiﬁes mechanisms for the decision by ﬁrms how to allocate workers to
routine and non-routine tasks, and thereby to utilize analytical and social
abilities of workers. Endogenizing the allocation of workers into routine
and non-routine tasks and taking into account their connection to unob-
servable abilities allows us to address within-group wage inequality as
found in standard estimations of Mincer equations. Distinguishing, in
addition, between education levels serves to examine the interaction
between within-group and between-group wage inequality in a model
with endogenous task composition.
As an immediate consequence of taking into account within-
group and between-group heterogeneity of workers as well as the
3 We signiﬁcantly extend our earlier framework (Egger and Grossmann, 2005),
which does not allow for heterogeneity of workers within education groups.
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heterogeneity of tasks in a uniﬁed framework, however, the analysis
becomes quite complex. But in our view, these cost in terms of
exposition has to be weighted against the beneﬁt of obtaining an
(admittedly still very stylized) theory in which not only the outcome
(wage inequality) but also the mechanism (restructuring and task
composition) is empirically testable. In other words, the advantage of
our approach is to bring light into the ‘‘black box’’ of production
process.
In the next section, we discuss supporting evidence of our analysis on
the evolution of task composition in ﬁrms and a frequently conﬁrmed
complementarity between skill-upgrading, new technologies and know-
ledge-based work organization. Section 3 sets up the model. Section 4
analyzes the equilibrium and provides comparative-static results.
Section 5 summarizes and brieﬂy argues that our model may shed light
into the differences in the evolution of wage inequality patterns between
the U.S. and Continental Europe. All proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 Evidence on Task Composition and Training
As argued above, the goal of our analysis is to simultaneously address
wage inequality within and between education groups together with
observed restructuring of ﬁrms towards non-routine tasks.
A growing body of empirical evidence attempts to obtain insight into
the nature of the apparent ‘‘skill-biased technological change’’ in the
developed world. For instance, autonomous problem-solving and
assignment of more responsibility to workers have been major inno-
vations in work organization practices (e.g., OECD, 1999, chap. 4).
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) and Bresnahan et al. (2002) for the U.S.,
and Falk (2002) for Germany ﬁnd a strong positive relationship between
computerization, organizational change and training provision. More-
over, evidence by Autor et al. (2003) for the U.S. and Spitz (2004) for
West Germany suggests that computerization has caused a signiﬁcant
shift in the job composition from routine to non-routine tasks.4 Their
results lend considerable support for the hypothesis that computer
4 As a consequence, the employment share of workers in routine tasks like
administrative work and mere machine operating has dramatically declined over
the last decades in favor of managing and professional tasks (e.g., Berman et al.,
1994; Bresnahan, 1999; Falkinger and Grossmann, 2003).
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technology is complementary to workers with relatively high analytical
and interactive abilities. Consistent with these kinds of evidence, our
model suggests that ICT has induced ﬁrms to incur training expendi-
tures to restructure towards non-routine tasks, and that this restructuring
favors workers with analytical and social skills.5 It is important to note
that this seems to concern all education levels. For instance, Spitz
(2004, table 6) ﬁnds that between 1979 and 1998/99 the share of
analytical and interactive tasks have increased even for low-educated
workers from 7.6 to 21.4 percent. For medium-educated and high-
educated workers, the change has been from 12.8 to 40.2 percent and
from 35.6 to 73 percent, respectively. Apart from the role of ICT, Caroli
and van Reenen (2001) present evidence from both France and UK
which is consistent with the impact of an increase in the educated
workforce in our model. Their ﬁndings suggest a strongly positive effect
of changes in the relative supply of skilled labor (proxied by regional
skill price differentials) on restructuring of ﬁrms towards such know-
ledge-based organizational forms. Finally, Gould (2002) provides
evidence on a surge of the demand for general skills like analytical and
social abilities within all broad occupations, along with rising residual
wage inequality.
3 The Model
We suppose that individual skills differ in two dimensions: ﬁrst, in
formal education levels and, second, in abilities like adaptability to new
environments as well as analytical, management and social (e.g., com-
munication) skills, which are typically unobservable for empirical
researchers.
Formally, suppose that there are two types of education levels, highly
educated (H) and less educated (L) labor. Both are inelastically
supplied in segmented and perfect labor markets. Labor supply is denoted
5 It is interesting to note that the required nature of training seem to have
changed along with this kind of restructuring. For instance, Barron et al. (1999)
ﬁnd for a random sample of 3600 US businesses from the Comprehensive
Business Database in 1992 that the average time a worker is in ‘‘informal
management training’’ is threefold the time she is in ‘‘formal training’’, and that
off-site training programs are by far less important than on-site training in the
ﬁrm.
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by H and L, respectively.6 To allow for within-group heterogeneity, e.g.,
capturing individual differences in analytical and social skills, ﬁrst, let L
individuals differ in ability b 2 B ¼ fb1; . . . ;bKg, 0  b1 <    <
bK <1. The supply of type b is denoted by lSðbÞ, i.e.,Pb2B lSðbÞ ¼ L.
Second, let Hworkers differ in ability c 2 C ¼ fc1; . . . ; cJg,
0  c1 <    < cJ <1. The supply of type c is denoted by hSðcÞ, i.e.,
P
c2C h
SðcÞ ¼ H .7
At the ﬁrm level, we distinguish between routine and non-routine
tasks in the production process of ﬁrms. The characterization of non-
routine tasks rests on two elements. First, workers assigned to
non-routine tasks are more productive than those in routine tasks but
costly in terms of non-production (e.g., managerial) labor. For instance,
performing non-routine production tasks requires steady provision of
information by non-production workers about production processes,
products, employers’ goals, work procedures, customer feedbacks, legal
regulations etc. We follow Porter (1986) in using the term ‘‘support
activities’’ for this kind of informal training provision. Thus, we refer to
workers assigned to non-routine tasks as ‘‘supported’’ workers. Second,
we assume that abilities like analytical and social skills play a role only
6 For instance, note that formal education levels are highly related to public
education policy (either by public scholling provision or by ﬁnancial aid for
university attendants), which, for simplicity, is treated as exogenous in our model.
The human capital literature has identiﬁed various factors which are relevant for
education decisions of individuals, e.g., credit constraints (Galor and Zeira,
1993), uncertainty (Levhari and Weiss, 1974; Gould et al., 2001) and social
networks (Be´nabou, 1996). Treating such factors as exogenous in an analysis of
wage inequality, i.e., and abstracting from the educational attainment decision,
follows, e.g., Acemoglu (1998; 1999) and Thesmar and Thoenig (2000), which
focus on wage inequality across education groups.
7 The few studies which control for measures of cognitive skills like scores
from IQ and other mental ability tests argue that – because of the high correlation
between cognitive skills and education levels – it is very difﬁcult to separate the
earning effects of cognitive ability from those of schooling (e.g., Cawley et al.
2001). This evidence suggests that differences in cognitive skills are of limited
value to explain wage inequality within education groups (e.g., Heckman, 2000;
Bowles et al., 2001). Consistent with this hypothesis, recent evidence from the
U.S. Bureau of the Census (1998) suggests that personal attributes like ‘‘attitude’’
and ‘‘communication skills’’ are much more important for the hiring decisions of
employers than ‘‘years of schooling’’ or ‘‘academic performance’’.
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for non-routine tasks, which captures in an extreme form that they are
more important for non-routine than for routine tasks.8
Formally, let there be a unit mass of ﬁrms which produce a homoge-
nous good in a perfect market. Output yi of ﬁrm i is produced according to
the linearly homogeneous function
yi ¼ F ~hi;~li
   ~lif jið Þ, ji  ~hi=~li, ð1Þ
(i.e., f ð Þ  F ; 1ð Þ), where ~hi and ~li denote efﬁciency units of H and
Llabor in production, respectively, i.e., ji is the education-intensity of
production labor. f ðÞ is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function
which fulﬁlls the boundary conditions lim
j!1f
0ðjÞ ¼ 0 and
lim
j!0þ
f 0ðjÞ ¼ 1. ~hi and ~li depend on the respective number of workers
assigned to routine and non-routine tasks, denoted by h1i , l
1
i and h
2
i , l
2
i ,
respectively, and the within-group ability distribution of workers assigned
to non-routine tasks in ﬁrm i. Let l^iðbÞ be the number of Lworkers in
ﬁrm i with ability b when assigned to non-routine tasks, i.e.,
l2i ¼
X
b2B
l^iðbÞ: ð2Þ
To simplify the analysis, suppose that Hworkers are equally productive
when assigned to non-routinized production activities. That is, c refers to
the ability of Hworkers to provide support to production workers (when
assigned as non-production worker), as introduced shortly.9 Total efﬁ-
ciency units of production labor within ﬁrm i may then be written as
~hi ¼ h1i þ ~h2i and ~li ¼ l1i þ ~l 2i , ð3Þ
8 For instance, to solve some problem, a worker needs to gather information
from coworkers, analyze the siutation in a reasonable amount of time, and make
the right decision. The information received from non-production workers sup-
ports them in taking the right steps, but how a production worker uses this
information depends on his/her personal traits.
9 Alternatively, one may assume that unobservable abilities relevant for support
tasks and production activities, respectively, are strongly positively correlated (as
plausible), and that Hworkers with a high level of such skills are more valuable
for ﬁrms in support tasks. Such a modiﬁcation would not yield much additional
insight but implies signiﬁcant cost, regarding the expositional simplicity of the
paper.
Non-Routine Tasks, Restructuring of Firms, Wage Inequality 203
respectively, where
~h2i ¼ ah2i and ~l2i ¼ b
X
b2B
bl^iðbÞ; ð4Þ
are the efﬁciency units in non-routine tasks of H and Llabor,
respectively. Parameters a and b are related to productivity differences
between non-routine and routine labor. To capture that supported workers
(h2, l2) have higher productivity than those who are assigned to routine
tasks (h1, l1) except, possibly, the least able Lworkers, suppose a > 1
and bb > 1 for all b 2 fb2; . . . ; bKg.10
A ﬁnal building block of our model is the ‘‘support technology’’,
reﬂecting the organizational (support/training) effort necessary to raise
productivity of production workers. To capture that these activities are
intensive in educated labor, suppose for simplicity that only Hworkers
can be assigned to these (non-routine) non-production tasks. Speciﬁcally,
in order to raise productivity of h2i and l
2
i workers (assigned to non-
routine tasks) with high and low education, respectively, ﬁrm i needs to
employ
~mi ¼ G h2i ; l2i
   l2i g við Þ; vi  h2i =l2i ; ð5Þ
efﬁciency units of non-production (H)labor, where G is a linearly
homogeneous function. Note that the intensive form in (5) requires
l2i > 0. We exclusively focus on this case in the following (in order to
avoid only mildly interesting borderline cases). vi is the education-
intensity of supported labor in ﬁrm i. Let gðÞ be a strictly increasing and
strictly convex function.11 That is, the support technology exhibits
complementarities among both types of labor (i.e., G12 < 0), in analogy
to the standard assumption that H and Llabor are complements in the
production technology F . (Note that g00 ð Þ > 0 is equivalent to G12 < 0
under linear homogeneity of G.) Let mi be the total amount of non-
10 The support activity may be time-consuming for employees. Implicitly, we
assume that workers receive wages during that time, i.e., ﬁrms bear the entire cost
of providing informal training to workers. Empirical evidence by Barron et al.
(1999) indeed strongly supports this assumption.
11 Thus, (5) may be viewed as joint production technology (e.g., Nadiri, 1987)
with two outputs (h2i and l
2
i ) and one input ( ~mi), which has a strictly decreasing
and strictly concave transformation curve.
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production labor and m^iðcÞ be the amount of type c employed as non-
production worker in ﬁrm i, respectively, i.e.,
mi ¼
X
c2C
m^iðcÞ: ð6Þ
For a given amount mi, efﬁciency units ~mi depend on the ability distri-
bution of c within ﬁrm i (e.g., reﬂecting differences in managerial ability)
according to
~mi ¼
X
c2C
cm^iðcÞ: ð7Þ
Finally, suppose that wage costs for non-production labor are variable
(rather than ﬁxed) costs.12 This reﬂects the idea that providing support to
production workers assigned to non-routine tasks is an ongoing necessity,
in contrast to one-shot formal training programmes which improve
workers’ human capital stock.
In sum, the model exhibits the minimum structure needed to examine
the decision of ﬁrms how to allocate workers with different skills to
different tasks, taking into account that non-production labor plays a
major role in the organization of ﬁrms and allowing for a second
dimension of skill in addition to formal education. Stated differently, the
theoretical innovation of the model is to allow for a distinction between a
‘‘Tayloristic’’ and a more ‘‘Holistic’’ organizational structure in ﬁrms,
where the latter is characterized by non-routine tasks which are more
productive, but also more costly (in terms of informal training provision)
than routine tasks.
12 As a consequence, ‘‘hold-up’’ problems, which are sometimes associated
with ﬁrm-speciﬁc training, are not an issue in this context. For instance, as Batt
(1999) points out, under new organizational forms, ‘‘...‘learning’ ... is a contin-
uous process of using new ideas and information as sources of innovation’’
(p. 541f.). ‘‘[V]irtually all training and work related information (work proce-
dures, system capabilities, product information, legal regulations) are on-line;
employees receive eight to ten e-mail messages per day advising them of any
updates in any of their systems’’ (p. 558).
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4 Equilibrium Analysis
This section provides the equilibrium analysis. After setting up the
equilibrium conditions, we derive comparative-static results regarding
technology parameters a, b, and changes in the supply of labor, H , L. This
allows us to analyze the behavioral response of ﬁrms to technology and
factor supply conditions on the task composition of ﬁrms and their impact
on wage inequality within and between education groups.
First, it is plausible to argue that the introduction of ICT and advances
in (human resource) management techniques can be reﬂected by an
increase in a and b (see (4)). For instance, new ICT reduces the cost of
lateral communication among workers and increases the ability to process
information (e.g., Radner, 1993; Lindbeck and Snower, 1996, 2000).
Second, as well known, the share of educated workers has considerably
increased in most advanced countries over the last decades, which is
reﬂected by an increase in /  H=L in our model.13 Note that, at least for
the 1970s, these education supply shifts were not a response to an
increasing college premium, which actually decreased in the 1970s in the
U.S. and remained fairly stable in Continental Europe during the last few
decades. Rather, consistent with our modelling strategy, it seems plausible
to interpret these shifts as being related to changes in exogenous factors
like the signiﬁcant increases in ﬁnancial aid for college students in the
U.S. and a surge in public education facilities in Continental Europe. We
exclusively focus on the case in which the composition of analytical and
social (i.e., typically unobservable) abilities remain unchanged if labor
supply changes. That is, hSðcÞ=H , c 2 C, and lSðbÞ=L, b 2 B, remain
constant if H or L changes. This assumption is consistent with the idea
that unobservable ability and education are not (perfectly) related to each
other.14
13 For instance, in the U.S., the share of workers with less than high-school
declined from 29 percent in 1970 to 19 percent in 1980 and 15 percent in 1990,
whereas the share of workers with some college increased from 32 to 42 and 46
percent in these years, respectively (Topel, 1997, table 1). Similar patterns have
been observed in Continental Europe (e.g., see Edin and Holmlund, 1995, for
Sweden and Abraham and Houseman, 1995, for Germany).
14 Insofar as analytical and social skills are related to non-cognitive abilities,
this is in line with the empirical observation that education levels are highly
correlated with cognitive but not with non-cognitive abilities (e.g., Cawley et al.,
2001).
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4.1. Equilibrium Conditions
Let w1h and w
1
l denote the wage rates of unsupported H and Llabor
assigned to routinized production tasks, respectively, w2h the wage rate of
supported Hlabor in modern production, and wmðcÞ and wlðbÞ the wage
rates of supporting labor of type c and supported Llabor of type b,
respectively. According to (1)–(5) and (7), the decision problem of ﬁrm i
is given by
max
h1i ;l
1
i ;h
2
i ;l^i bð Þ;b2B;m^i cð Þ;c2C
F h1i þ ah2i ; l1i þ b
X
b2B
bl^i bð Þ
 !
 w1hh1i  w1l l1i  w2hh2i 
X
b2B
wl bð Þl^i bð Þ

X
c2C
wm cð Þm^i cð Þ s.t.
X
c2C
cm^i cð Þ ¼ G h2i ;
X
b2B
l^i bð Þ
 !
; ð8Þ
and subject to nonnegativity constraints.15 If l2i > 0, the ﬁrst-order con-
ditions from optimization problem (8) can be written as
f 0 jið Þ ¼ w1h; ð9Þ
af 0 jið Þ  w2h þ kig0 við Þ; ð10Þ
f jið Þ  jif 0 jið Þ ¼ w1l ; ð11Þ
bb f jið Þ  jif 0 jið Þð Þ  wl bð Þ þ ki g við Þ  vig0 við Þð Þ; b 2 B; ð12Þ
kic  wm cð Þ; c 2 C; ð13Þ
holding with equality if the relevant non-negativity constraint is binding.16
ki denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint in (8).
The left-hand sides of (9)–(12) are the marginal products of the respective
types of labor, whereas the right-hand sides are the marginal costs (which,
for supported labor, also contain the costs of non-production labor).
15 Implicitly, we assume that ﬁrms can perfectly screen workers with respect to
abilities b and c, respectively, e.g., through job interviews and assessment centers.
16 Note that (9) and (11) are equalities, according to the Inada conditions
regarding f . Moreover, (12) is binding at least for one b 2 B under l2i > 0.
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We focus on a symmetric equilibrium (and thus omit the ﬁrm index i
from now on).17 Full employment in equilibrium with a unit mass of ﬁrms
then implies
h1 þ h2 þ m ¼ H ; l1 þ l2 ¼ L: ð14Þ
Since Hlabor assigned to production tasks is homogeneous and the
wage costs for non-production Hworkers are entirely born by ﬁrms, we
have w1h ¼ w2h  wh in equilibrium.18
Let the relative wage of labor in routine tasks, x  wh=w1l , be our
measure of between-group wage inequality.19 According to (9) and (11),
x ¼ f
0 jð Þ
f jð Þ  jf 0 jð Þ  XðjÞ; ð15Þ
where X0ðjÞ < 0. The following ﬁrst result emerges.
Lemma 1: In equilibrium, there exist threshold ability levels ~b 2 B and
~c 2 C such that the following holds.
(i) l^ bð Þ ¼ lS bð Þ for all b > ~b, l^ð~bÞ > 0, and l^ bð Þ ¼ 0 for all b < ~b.
Moreover, wlðbÞ=w1l ¼ bðb ~bÞ þ 1 for all b  ~b if l^ð~bÞ < lSð~bÞ,
whereas l^ð~bÞ ¼ lSð~bÞ implies wlð~bÞ  w1l and, with c  ~c,
bb ¼ wlðbÞ
w1l
þ wmðcÞ
wh
x
g vð Þ  vg0 vð Þ
c
for all b  ~b: ð16Þ
17 As often the case in models with identical ﬁrms, it is conceivable that
asymmetric equilibria exist in addition to a symmetric one. However, note that
ji ¼ j is directly implied by (9) or (11), respectively. Also note that, due to the
linear-homogeneity of functions F and G, ﬁrms make zero proﬁts in equilibrium.
18 Moreover, as will become apparent below, the symmetric equilibrium is
unique.
19 We suppose h1 > 0 and l1 > 0 to focus on interior solutions (which is the
empirically relevant case). In fact, if the majority of less educated workers still
holds traditional jobs and the majority of educated labor are production workers
(as plausible for the time periods which most empirical studies about the evo-
lution of wage inequality have considered), x represents the relative median
wage of educated labor.
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(ii) m^ cð Þ ¼ hS cð Þ for all c > ~c, m^ ~cð Þ > 0, and m^ cð Þ ¼ 0 for all c < ~c.
Moreover, wmð~cÞ ¼ wh and wmðcÞ=wh ¼ c=~c for all c  ~c if
m^ ~cð Þ < hS ~cð Þ, whereas m^ ~cð Þ ¼ hS ~cð Þ implies wmð~cÞ  wh and
a ¼ 1þ wmðcÞ
wh
g0 vð Þ
c
for all c  ~c. ð17Þ
Proof: See Appendix.
Part (i) of Lemma 1 states that Lworkers are supported (i.e., are
assigned to non-routine tasks) up to a threshold level ~b in the ability
distribution of b, whereas those with ability lower than ~b are assigned to
routine tasks. Lworkers with ability above threshold ~b earn a wage
premium (i.e., wlðbÞ=w1l ¼ bðb ~bÞ þ 1 > 1 for all b > ~b), whereas
wlð~bÞ ¼ w1l if Lworkers of type ~b are not a scarce resource (i.e., if
l^ð~bÞ < lSð~bÞ). If l^ð~bÞ ¼ lSð~bÞ, however, then wlð~bÞ > w1l typically holds
(except of a knife-edge case). Similarly, Hworkers with ability c  ~c
are assigned to non-production tasks, and always earn a wage premium
(as wmðcÞ=wh ¼ c=~c for all c  ~c) if ability c exceeds threshold ability ~c.
(Also the remainder of part (ii) of Lemma 1 is analogous to part (i)).
Let within-group wage inequality be measured by relative wages of
workers assigned to non-routinized jobs, wm cð Þ=wh , c  ~c, and wl bð Þ=w1l ,
b  ~b, respectively.20 Thus, (16) and (17) jointly give us a relationship
between within-group wage inequality and between-group wage
inequality (measured by x). In particular, within-group inequality and
between-group inequality may be negatively related. The left-hand side of
(16) is the productivity of a supported Lworker with ability b relative to
that of a Lworker in a routinized job, whereas the right-hand side is the
respective relative cost. This relative cost consists of four (endogenous)
components: within-group relative wage wlðbÞ=w1l of a Lworker of type
b, within-group relative wage wmðcÞ=wh of a non-production (H)worker
of type c, between-group relative wage x, and the marginal physical cost
20 Suppose that sufﬁcient shares of workers in the economy are in Tayloristic
and modern jobs within each education group, respectively, and the b,
cabilities are sufﬁciently dispersed. Then, these inequality measures correspond
for some particular ability type to the 90-10 wage differential within an education
group. This measure is often used in empirical studies (e.g., Katz and Autor,
1999).
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of a Hworker with ability c to support Lworkers.21 Similarly, the
left-hand side of (17) is the relative productivity of a supportedHworker,
Table 1. Comparative-static results (marginal effects)
Scenario 1: l^ð~bÞ < lSð~bÞ and m^ ~cð Þ < hS ~cð Þ
l^ ~bð Þ
L
m^ ~cð Þ
H x
wl bð Þ
w1l
, b  ~b wm cð Þwh , c  ~c
/ + + 0 0 0
a + + + 0 0
b +,0,) +,0,) + + 0
Scenario 2: l^ð~bÞ ¼ lSð~bÞ and m^ ~cð Þ < hS ~cð Þ
m^ ~cð Þ
H x
wl bð Þ
w1l
, b  ~b wm cð Þwh , c  ~c
/ ) ) + 0
a + ) + 0
b 0 + +,0,) 0
Scenario 3: l^ð~bÞ ¼ lSð~bÞ and m^ ~cð Þ ¼ hS ~cð Þ
x wl bð Þw1l
; b  ~b wm cð Þwh , c  ~c
/ ) + )
a ) +,0,) +
b + +,0,) 0
Scenario 4: l^ð~bÞ < lSð~bÞ and m^ ~cð Þ ¼ hS ~cð Þ
l^ ~bð Þ
L x
wl bð Þ
w1l
, b  ~b wm cð Þwh , c  ~c
/ + ) 0 +
a +,0,) ) 0 +
b +,0,) + + +,0,)
21 Note that we decomposed wmðcÞ=w1l into wmðcÞ=whð Þ  x (recall x ¼
wh=w1l ).
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whereas the right-hand side is the respective relative cost. The latter
consists of three components: the relative wage of a supported Hworker
in production (which equals unity since w1h ¼ w2h ¼ wh), within-group
relative wage wmðcÞ=wh of a non-production worker of type c, and the
marginal physical cost of such a Hworker.
Lemma 1 also indicates that there are potential differences regarding
within-group wage inequality between scenarios with l^ð~bÞ < lSð~bÞ (i.e.,
not all Lworkers with threshold ability ~b are supported) or
m^ ~cð Þ < hS ~cð Þ, and scenarios with l^ð~bÞ ¼ lSð~bÞ or m^ ~cð Þ ¼ hS ~cð Þ, respec-
tively. This plays an important role for the comparative-static analysis
presented in the next subsection.
4.2. Comparative-statics
According to Lemma 1, there are four possible scenarios for which we
can study the marginal impact of changes in relative labor supply
/ ¼ H=L (holding the composition of abilities constant) and technology
shifts, reﬂected by changes in a or b:
(1) l^ð~bÞ < lSð~bÞ and m^ ~cð Þ < hS ~cð Þ,
(2) l^ð~bÞ ¼ lSð~bÞ and m^ ~cð Þ < hS ~cð Þ,
(3) l^ð~bÞ ¼ lSð~bÞ and m^ ~cð Þ ¼ hS ~cð Þ, and
(4) l^ð~bÞ < lSð~bÞ and m^ ~cð Þ ¼ hS ~cð Þ.
Lemma 2: Comparative-static results for scenarios 1–4 are as shown in
Table 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
The remainder of this section discusses the intuition of Lemma 2 and
derives implications. We start with changes in the relative supply of
educated labor, /.
4.2.1 Relative Supply of Educated Labor
According to Table 1, whenever l^ð~bÞ < lSð~bÞ (i.e., scenarios 1 and 4),
l^ð~bÞ=L is strictly increasing in the relative supply of Hlabor, / ¼ H=L.
That is, an increase in / induces ﬁrms to restructure in the sense that a
higher share of the Llabor force is assigned to non–Tayloristic jobs.
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Moreover, for a certain range of relative supply /, ﬁrms may choose not
to support workers from a low-ability group, even though all workers
from an adjacent group with higher ability b is already assigned to non-
routinized jobs. Before discussing the intuition of these results, note that
this implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1: For any k ¼ 2; . . . ;K, there exist /k1, /k2, /k3, with 0 < /k1 <
/k2 < /
k
3 and /
k1
1 ¼ /k3, such that
(i) ~b ¼ bk for all / 2 ð/k1;/k3 and ~b < bk for all / > /k3,
(ii) l^ð~bÞ < lSð~bÞ for all / 2 ð/k1;/k2Þ and l^ð~bÞ ¼ lSðbÞ for all /  /k2.
Thus, according to Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Corollary 1, our measure of
wage inequality within the group of Lworkers for a particular ability
type bk > ~b, wlðbkÞ=w1l , evolves with increasing relative supply of
Hworkers, /, as shown in Fig. 1. The next result is thus immediately
implied by the preceding ones.
Proposition 1 (Within-group wage inequality and education): (i) Wage
inequality within the group of Lworkers is a non-decreasing (and
continuous) function of / ¼ H=L , and strictly increasing in / over some
ranges. (ii) The impact of an increase in / on wage inequality within the
group of Hworkers is ambiguous.
Let us start with a discussion of part (i) of Proposition 1. The crucial
insight is that an increase in / raises the incentive of ﬁrms to reallocate
Llabor towards non-routinized production tasks, i.e., training of
Lworkers becomes more attractive. To see this, suppose this would not
be the case. Then, an increase in / unambiguously raises education-
intensity of production labor, j ¼ ~h=~l. Thus, all other things equal,
between-group relative wage x declines, according to (15). Ceteris par-
ibus, this reduces the relative marginal costs to support Lworkers (since
this is intensive in Hlabor), which is given by the right-hand side of
(16). This gives ﬁrms an incentive to support a higher share of Lworkers
and thus raises the demand for babilities. Thus, for given within-group
wage inequality (i.e., as long as l^ð~bÞ=L < lSð~bÞ=L, given threshold ability
level ~b), l^ð~bÞ=L will rise (scenarios 1 and 4 in Table 1). However, as soon
as l^ð~bÞ ¼ lSð~bÞ is reached (at some /2 in Fig. 1), a further marginal
increase in / does not make support of workers with lower ability than,
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say, bk ¼ ~b attractive (scenarios 2 and 3).22 In this case, rising demand for
all types b  bk meets ‘‘ﬁxed supply’’ such that wlð~bÞ=w1l rises with /.
At some level of wage inequality wlð~bÞ=w1l, assigning Llabor with
ability bk1 < bk to non-routine tasks becomes attractive as / increases
so that ~b falls to bk1.23 (Then we again start from scenario 1 or 4.)
Interestingly, regarding part (ii) of Proposition 1, the impact of an
increase in / on m^ cð Þ=H and wm cð Þ=wh, respectively, is less clear. This is
due to our assumptions that non-routine tasks require educated labor for
support and Hindividuals differ in the ability to provide such support.
To see this, ﬁrst, note that between-group relative wage x does not enter
equation (17), which equates the relative beneﬁt and relative costs of
assigning Hworkers to non-routine rather than routine production tasks.
According to the previous discussion, an increase in / raises the incentive
to assign Llabor towards non-routinized jobs. This increases the non-
production labor requirement for provision of support. Thus, if l^ð~bÞ=L
gradually increases with /, then there are two possibilities. Either
1
( )kl
l
w
w
β
1
/H Lφ =2kφ 3kφ φ k−1= 12kφ − 1 23kφ φ− −= 22φ 23φ1 1k
Fig. 1 Wage dispersion within the group of L–workers
22 In terms of Corollary 1 and Fig. 1, respectively, given that ~b ¼ bk , scenarios
1 or 4 apply if / rises in the interval ð/k1;/k2Þ, whereas scenarios 2 or 3 apply if /
rises in the interval ½/k2;/k3Þ.
23 At this point, wlðbkÞ=w1l ¼ bðbk  bk1Þ þ 1, according to Lemma 1.
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m^ ~cð Þ=H rises without raising wm cð Þ=wh, c  ~c, which occurs as long as
m^ ~cð Þ=H < hS ~cð Þ=H (i.e., Hworkers of type ~c are not scarce yet) or
wm cð Þ=wh rises for all c  ~c. (These possibilities refer to scenarios 1 or 4,
respectively.) Moreover, as long as l^ð~bÞ=L increases with / for given ~b,
threshold ability level ~c may fall after an increase in / from, say, type cj
to cj1. To the contrary, if l^ð~bÞ ¼ lSð~bÞ, then an increase in / does not
raise demand for cabilities. On the one hand, if m^ ~cð Þ=H < hS ~cð Þ=H ,
then an even lower share of non-production workers is needed to support
the same fraction l2=L of Llabor after a marginal increase in /, i.e.,
m^ ~cð Þ=H declines (scenario 2). On the other hand, if m^ ~cð Þ ¼ hS ~cð Þ, the
reduction in demand for cabilities after a marginal increase in / is
reﬂected by a decline in wm cð Þ=wh, c  ~c (scenario 3). However, when-
ever m=H does not decline after a (marginal or non-marginal) increase in
/, then wage inequality within the group of Hlabor does not decrease
and, possibly, increases.
In sum, Proposition 1 is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings dis-
cussed in Sects. 1 and 2 that both overall within-group wage inequality
and the share of workers assigned to non–Tayloristic jobs have risen, that
these developments were accompanied by increased training provision
within ﬁrms and that the observed increase in the relative supply of
educated labor seemed to have a signiﬁcant impact on restructuring of
ﬁrms towards knowledge-based organizational forms.
At the same time, however, many countries have experienced stag-
nating or even declining between-group wage inequality.24 To address
this fact, we now investigate the impact of an increase in / ¼ H=L on
x ¼ wh=w1l .
Proposition 2 (Between-group wage inequality and education): Between-
group wage inequality is a non-increasing function of / ¼ H=L.
For the intuition of the /-effect on x ¼ wh=w1l we consider two dif-
ferent cases suggested by Table 1. First, if l^ð~bÞ < lSð~bÞ and
m^ ~cð Þ=H < hS ~cð Þ=H simultaneously hold (scenario 1), a marginal
increase in / raises the share of L labor assigned to non-routinized jobs
(as argued above). This stimulates demand for non-production workers,
thereby raising m=H . Both the implied reallocation of Hlabor away
from production and the increase in efﬁciency units of Llabor reduce
24 In particular, this applies to Continental European countries, but also the
U.S. in the 1970s.
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education-intensity of production labor j ¼ ~h=~l. This is a counteracting
effect of an increase in / on j.25 In sum, both j and thus between-group
wage inequality x remain unaffected.26 Second, if one of the two con-
ditions l^ð~bÞ  lSð~bÞ and m^ ~cð Þ  hS ~cð Þ is binding, a marginal increase in
/ reduces (scenario 2) or does not affect (scenarios 3 and 4) the share of
non-production workers in the total supply of Hlabor. This gives rise to
a positive impact of an increase in / on j and, therefore, reduces x,
according to (15).
Taken together, Propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate that within-group
wage inequality and between-group wage inequality can be adversely
related, given the same factor supply shock.27 However, an increase in /
alone cannot explain the Anglo-American experience of rising wage
inequality within and between groups in the 1980s and most of the 1990s.
To address this fact, we now turn to the impact of technological change.
4.2.2 New Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)
Most of the literature on the relationship between wage inequality and
technological change has focussed on biased changes in the production
technology, in the sense of an (exogenous or endogenous) increase in
marginal productivity of educated relative to less educated labor.28 In
25 Note that such a counteracting effect is absent in a conventional model
which does not distinguish between production-related tasks on the one hand and
non-production tasks on the other hand.
26 The effects regarding x and the allocation of labor in scenario 1 are similar
to those discussed in Egger and Grossmann (2005), in which, however, we did
not allow for within-group heterogeneity. Thus, scenarios 2–4 could not occur in
this model.
27 Typically, the (still rare) literature which allows for both between-group and
within-group wage inequality does not acount for this possibility. A notable
exception is the paper by Gould et. al. (2001), in which an increasing variance of
the rate of technological progress across sectors raises residual wage inequality
but, at the same time, depresses the education premium.
28 In our model, this could be reﬂected by an increase in F1=F2 (for any given
education-intensity j). It has been established in a series of papers (focussing on
different kinds of models and questions) that, somewhat surprisingly, such skill-
biased technology change has an ambiguous effects on between-group wage
inequality if one allows for some skill-intensive, productivity-enhancing tech-
nology like (5). Moreover, in such a model, biased technological change of this
sort counterfactually leads to a decline in the non-production employment share.
See also Grossmann (2002), Falkinger and Grossmann (2003), and Egger and
Grossmann (2005) for these kinds of reasoning.
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contrast, we consider a kind of technological change which raises the
productivity gain from allocating workers towards non-routine jobs,
represented by shifts in a and b in our model.
An increase in a raises the relative productivity of supported
Hworkers in production (h2), according to (17), and thus has a positive
effect on the demand for non-production activities. This raises either the
share of non-production workers in total supply of Hlabor, m=H
(scenarios 1 and 2) or wmð~cÞ=w1h for all c  ~c (scenarios 3 and 4). Thus,
the impact of an increase in a on within-group wage inequality of
Hlabor is completely analogous to the impact of an increase in / on
that of Llabor (which is depicted in Fig. 1). Regarding between-group
wage inequality, x, however, the effect of a higher a is less clear-cut (i.e.,
is positive in scenario 1 but negative otherwise). The reason is that,
holding everything else constant, a is positively related to the education-
intensity of production labor, j ¼ ~h=~l (which in turn is negatively related
to x), according to (3) and (4).29
To the contrary, an increase in b raises x in all scenarios, but the effects
on within-group wage inequality are more ambiguous. First, a higher b
has a direct negative effect on j (analogous to the direct positive effect of
a on j), which ultimately gives rise to an increase in between-group wage
inequality x in all four scenarios. Second, since an increase in b raises the
productivity of Lworkers in non-routine relative to those in routine
tasks, demand for babilities of Llabor is raised, all other things equal.
However, an increase in x is associated with an increase in the marginal
cost of support activity, according to (16), and therefore reduces the
demand for babilities. This counteracts the aforementioned effect,
leaving the impact of an increase in b on within-group wage inequality
wl bð Þ=w1l , b  ~b, generally ambiguous. The impact of an increase in b on
wl bð Þ=w1l , b  ~b, is only unambiguously positive if l^ð~bÞ < lSð~bÞ
(scenarios 1 and 4). We can thus conclude that the following robust
relationships hold.
29 Only in scenario 1 in which a marginal increase in a induces a reallocation
of workers towards non-routine jobs in both education groups, x ¼ wh=w1l rises.
This is because, as is intuitive, an increase in a raises the education-intensity of
supported labor, v ¼ h2=l2 (formally shown in the proof of Lemma 2). In turn,
this lowers the marginal costs to support Lworkers since g00ðÞ > 0. Hence,
relative demand for non-production workers rises. Since wmð~cÞ ¼ wh in
scenario 1, according to Lemma 1, x rises despite the fact that a is positively
related to j for a given allocation of labor.
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Proposition 3 (Wage inequality and advances in ICT): (i) Within-group
wage inequality of Hworkers is a non-decreasing (and continuous)
function of a, and strictly increasing in a over some ranges. (ii) Between-
group wage inequality is strictly increasing in b.
In sum, we may conclude that technological changes which raise a and
b simultaneously (and thus raise the incentive of ﬁrms to reassign workers
to non-Tayloristic tasks) can explain both rising inequality within the
group of educated workers and rising between-group wage inequality.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has argued that both rising relative supply of educated labor
and technological change has led to restructuring processes within ﬁrms
which raised the demand for typically (to empirical researchers) unob-
servable abilities like analytical and social skills. The contribution of our
paper is to propose a theory on equilibrium responses of ﬁrms to changing
technology and factor supply conditions in allocating labor to routine and
non-routine tasks, and to analyze their implications for skill prices within
and across education groups. Our model rests on the hypotheses that (i) a
reallocation of labor towards non-routine tasks is productivity-enhancing
but costly in terms of training provision, (ii) analytical and social ability is
more relevant for performing non-routine tasks, and (iii) organizational
(e.g., human resource management) activity within ﬁrms is skill-inten-
sive. Our results are not only consistent with empirical evidence on a
pervasive rise in within-group wage inequality and possibly stagnating or
falling wage dispersion between education groups, but also contribute to
an understanding of why these developments occurred at the same time as
ﬁrms reorganized work towards non–Tayloristic jobs throughout the
developed world. In fact, the empirical literature on ‘‘skill-biased tech-
nological change’’ (e.g., Berman et al., 1994; Bresnahan, 1999;
Bresnahan et al., 2002) has always pointed out that understanding
changes in the demand for skills requires to take into account restruc-
turing processes within ﬁrms. However, surprisingly little theoretical
work has been done in this area so far.
An important and still ongoing debate in the context of wage inequality
is why the education premium in Continental Europe evolved so differ-
ently as opposed to the U.S. and UK. Although relative supply of edu-
cated labor has increased considerably during the last few decades in
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basically all advanced countries, one center of this debate has been
whether differences in skill supply growth rates across countries or
institutional differences is the main reason for rather stable education
premia in Europe and sharply rising ones (at least in the 1980s and most
of the 1990s) in the U.S. (e.g., Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). In a
well-recognized paper, Blau and Kahn (1996) ﬁnd no evidence in favor of
market forces to reconcile these different wage patterns (under the
hypothesis of similar technology-induced changes in the labor demand
composition across countries), based on the years of schooling as a
measure of skill. However, as pointed out by Acemoglu (2002), the
institutional view cannot explain why unemployment rates have risen
almost proportionally for educated and less educated workers (Nickell
and Bell, 1996, 1997). A recent paper by Leuven et al. (2004) is capable
to reconcile this conﬂicting evidence. By constructing internationally
comparable measures of skill, they ﬁnd that up to ‘‘60 percent of the
variation in skill wage differential is explained by relative net supply’’
(Leuven et al., 2004, p. 482), diametrical to the ﬁndings by Blau and
Kahn.30 Insofar as skill supply shifts can be viewed as exogenous events
(e.g., signiﬁcantly affected by public policy), this is consistent with our
analysis.31 In addition, our model can explain why, at the same time, both
within-group wage inequality and the organizational set up in ﬁrms has
changed also in Continental Europe.
Our ﬁnal remark is a tentative policy conclusion. Our model has
emphasized the role of unobserved heterogeneity for both observed wage
patterns and the incentive of ﬁrms to restructure towards organizational
forms which require analytical and interactive abilities. In other words,
shortage of such skills may be an impediment for ﬁrms to enhance pro-
ductivity and may be the major source of low earnings individually, partly
irrespective of formal education. In fact, as argued by Heckman (2000),
labor market programmes aiming at raising qualiﬁcations of workers
30 Leuven et al. (2004) are capable of reproducing the ﬁndings of Blau and
Kahn (1996) within their data set by employing years of schooling as skill
measure, suggesting that results are very sensitive to the skill measure used.
31 This is not to deny that also institutional factors (e.g., like strong unions or
minimum wages) have contributed to stagnating education premia in Continental
Europe. What it means, as pointed by Leuven et al. (2004, p. 484), is that the
‘‘relative contribution of institutions and market forces are, however, still
unknown’’. Our model has abstracted from labor market institutions to focus on
market forces.
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often turn out to be almost ineffective to boost earning prospects due to
the lack of social skills. Our model suggests that this problem may require
an increased emphasis on social abilities in high-school education or even
earlier in order to reverse inequality trends.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Perfect competition in the labor market implies that 0 < l^ðbÞ < lSðbÞ
(0 < m^ðcÞ < hSðcÞ) is only consistent with an equilibrium if wlðbÞ ¼ w1l ,
b 2 B (wmðcÞ ¼ wh, c 2 C). Hence, it is an immediate consequence of
proﬁt maximization that 0 < l^ð~bÞ  lSð~bÞ (0 < m^ ~cð Þ  hS ~cð Þ) requires
l^ bð Þ ¼ lS bð Þ for all b > ~b (m^ cð Þ ¼ hS cð Þ for all c > ~c) and l^ bð Þ ¼ 0 for
all b < ~b (m^ cð Þ ¼ 0 for all c > ~c). Moreover, note from (13) that
k ¼ wm cð Þ=c for all c  ~c. Thus, (11) and (12) imply for all b  ~b and
c  ~c that
bbw1l ¼ wl bð Þ þ
wm cð Þ
c
g vð Þ  vg0 vð Þð Þ; ðA.1Þ
whereas (9) and (10) imply
awh ¼ wh þ wm cð Þc g
0 vð Þ ðA.2Þ
for all c  ~c. Equations (16) and (17) follow from (A.1), (A.2) and deﬁ-
nition x ¼ wh=w1l . Moreover, using the facts that wlð~bÞ ¼ w1l if
l^ð~bÞ < lSð~bÞ and wmð~cÞ ¼ wh if m^ ~cð Þ < hS ~cð Þ, (A.1) and (A.2) conﬁrm
wlðbÞ=w1l ¼ bðb ~bÞ þ 1 for all b  ~b andwmðcÞ=wh ¼ c=~c for all c  ~c,
respectively. However, note that wlð~bÞ > w1l and wmð~cÞ > wh is possible if
l^ð~bÞ ¼ lSð~bÞ and m^ ~cð Þ ¼ hS ~cð Þ, respectively, since threshold ability types
are a scarce resource in this case. h
Proof of Lemma 2
First, note that using ~h2 ¼ ah2, (3), (14) and v ¼ h2=l2, j ¼ ~h2=~l2 can be
written as
j ¼ h
1 þ ~h2
l1 þ ~l2 ¼
/ 1 mH
 þ a 1ð Þv l2L
1 l2L þ
~l2
L
ðA.3Þ
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(recall / ¼ H=L). Also note that Lemma 1 implies
l2 ¼
X
b>~b
lS bð Þ þ l^ð~bÞ; ðA.4Þ
~l2 ¼b
X
b>~b
blS bð Þ þ ~bl^ð~bÞ
0
@
1
A; ðA.5Þ
m ¼
X
c>~c
hS cð Þ þ m^ ~cð Þ; ðA.6Þ
~m ¼
X
c>~c
cmS cð Þ þ ~cm^ ~cð Þ; ðA.7Þ
according to (2), (4), (6), (7). We now explore comparative-static effects
for scenarios 1–4 separately.
Ad scenario 1: Recall from Lemma 1 that l^ð~bÞ < lSð~bÞ and m^ ~cð Þ
< hS ~cð Þ imply wlðbÞ=w1l ¼ bðb ~bÞ þ 1 for all b  ~b and wmðcÞ=wh ¼
c=~c for all c  ~c, respectively, thus conﬁrming our results for within-group
inequality. Moreover, recall wlð~bÞ ¼ w1l and wmð~cÞ ¼ wh. Thus, (A.1) and
(A.2) imply that g vð Þ  vg0 vð Þð Þ x ¼ ðb~b 1Þ~c and
g0 vð Þ ¼ ða 1Þ~c () v ¼ ðg0Þ1 ða 1Þ~cð Þ  ~vðaÞ
ðþÞ
; ðA.8Þ
respectively, where ~vðaÞ is increasing in a. Thus,
x ¼ ðb
~b 1Þ~c
g vð Þ  vg0ðvÞ½ v¼~vðaÞ
 ~xð a
ðþÞ
; b
ðþÞ
Þ; ðA.9Þ
where @ ~x=@a > 0,32 @ ~x=@b > 0 and @ ~x=@/ ¼ 0. Using x ¼ XðjÞ,
according to (15), we ﬁnd that j ¼ X1ð~xða; bÞÞ  ~jða; bÞ, where
@~j=@a < 0 and @~j=@b < 0, since X0ðjÞ < 0, and @~j=@/ ¼ 0. Also note
that combining l2 ¼ ~m=g vð Þ from (5) with (A.4) and (A.7), and rear-
ranging terms, yields
32 Use the fact that g vð Þ  vg0 vð Þ½  is strictly decreasing in v together with the
properties of ~vðaÞ.
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l^ð~bÞ
L
¼
/
P
c>~c c
hS cð Þ
H þ ~c m^ ~cð ÞH
 
g vð Þ 
X
b>~b
lS bð Þ
L
: ðA.10Þ
Substituting (A.4)–(A.6) into (A.3) and then using (A.8) and (A.10)
yields
1 1 gð~vðaÞÞ½  m^ ~cð ÞH þ
P
c>~c gð~vðaÞÞ c~c  1
 
hS cð Þ
H
1
/ þ b
~b1
g ~vðaÞð Þ
P
c>~c c
hS cð Þ
H þ ~c m^ ~cð ÞH
 
þ b/
P
b>~bðb ~bÞ l
S bð Þ
L
 ~jða; bÞ ¼ 0;
ðA.11Þ
where gðvÞ  vg0 vð Þ=g vð Þ, v ¼ ~vðaÞ and j ¼ ~jða; bÞ have been used.
(A.11) deﬁnes m^ ~cð Þ=H implicitly as function of ða; b;/Þ. Comparative-
static results regarding m^ ~cð Þ=H follow from applying the implicit func-
tion theorem to (A.11) and observing the properties of ~vðaÞ and ~jða; bÞ. 33
For the results regarding l^ð~bÞ=L, note that combining (5) with (A.7)
yields
m^ ~cð Þ
H
¼ g ~vðaÞð Þ
~c/
l2
L

X
c>~c
c
~c
hS cð Þ
H
: ðA.12Þ
Next, substitute (A.5), (A.6) and (A.8) into (A.3) and use both v ¼ ~vðaÞ
and (A.12) to obtain
j ¼
/ 1þPc>~c c~c  1
 
hS cð Þ
H
 
 1~c g vð Þ  vg0 vð Þ½ v¼~vðaÞl
2
L
1 l2L þ b
P
b>~b b
lS bð Þ
L þ b~b
lS ~bð Þ
L
: ðA.13Þ
Finally, substitute (A.4) into (A.13) and use j ¼ ~jða; bÞ which leads to
/ 1þPc>~c c~c~c m^ ~cð ÞH
h i
m^ ~cð Þ
H  1~c l
2
L g vð Þ  vg0ðvÞ½ v¼~vðaÞ
1þPb>~b bb 1ð Þ l
S bð Þ
L þ b~b 1
 
l^ð~bÞ
L
 ~jða; bÞ ¼ 0:
ðA:14Þ
33 Recall that lS bð Þ=L, b > ~b, and mS cð Þ=H , c > ~c, are not affected by / due
to the assumption of constant within-group compositions of abilities b and c,
respectively. Moreover, note that g0ðvÞ > 0 since g vð Þ  vg0 vð Þ > 0 and
g00 vð Þ > 0.
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(A.14) deﬁnes l^ð~bÞ=L implicitly as function of ða; b;/Þ. Comparative-
static results regarding l^ð~bÞ=L follow from applying the implicit function
theorem to (A.14) and, again, observing the properties of ~vðaÞ and
~jða; bÞ.
Ad scenario 2: First, note that m^ ~cð Þ < hS ~cð Þ implies that
wmðcÞ=wh ¼ c=~c for all c  ~c, thus conﬁrming our results regarding
inequality within the group of Hworkers. Moreover, (A.8) still holds.
Also note that l^ð~bÞ ¼ lSð~bÞ implies that l2=L is constant, according to
(A.4). Thus, using (A.12) conﬁrms the results regarding m^ ~cð Þ=H . Next,
use l^ð~bÞ ¼ lSð~bÞ in (A.13) and recall ~v0ðaÞ > 0 to conﬁrm that j is
strictly increasing in both a and /, and strictly decreasing in b. Using
x ¼ XðjÞ with X0ðjÞ < 0, according to (15), conﬁrms the results
regarding x. Finally, use these results and substitute v ¼ ~vðaÞ from (A.8)
into (16) to conﬁrm the results regarding wl bð Þ=w1l ; b > ~b.
Ad scenario 3: First, note that l^ð~bÞ ¼ lSð~bÞ implies that l2=L is con-
stant and ~l2=L ¼ bPb~b blS bð Þ=L, according to (A.4) and (A.5),
respectively. Similarly, m^ ~cð Þ ¼ hS ~cð Þ implies that m=H is constant and
~m=H ¼Pc~c cmS cð Þ, according to (A.6) and (A.7), respectively. Thus,
~m ¼ l2g vð Þ implies that
v ¼ g1 /
P
c>~c cm
S cð Þ=H
l2=L
 !
 ~~vð /
ðþÞ
Þ; ðA.15Þ
where ~~vð/Þ is increasing in /. Substituting both ~l2=L ¼ bPb~b blS bð Þ=L
and (A.15) into (A.3) leads to
j ¼ / 1
m
H
 þ a 1ð Þ~~vð/Þ l2L
1 l2L þ b
P
b~b b
lS bð Þ
L
 ~~jð a
ðþÞ
; b
ðÞ
; /
ðþÞ
Þ: ðA.16Þ
Thus, ~~jða; b;/Þ is increasing in a and /, and decreasing in b. Noting that
x ¼ Xð~~jða; b;/ÞÞ  ~~xða; b;/Þ from (15) conﬁrms the results regarding
x. Moreover, substituting v ¼ ~~vð/Þ and x ¼ ~~xða; b;/Þ into (16) and
observing functional properties conﬁrms our results for wl bð Þ=w1l , b  ~b.
Similarly, substituting v ¼ ~~vð/Þ into (17) conﬁrms the results regarding
wm cð Þ=wh, c  ~c.
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Ad scenario 4: First, note that l^ð~bÞ < lSð~bÞ implies wlðbÞ=w1l ¼
bðb ~bÞ þ 1 for all b  ~b, thus conﬁrming our results regarding
inequality within the group of Lworkers. Substituting (A.4) and (A.7)
into ~m ¼ l2g vð Þ from (5) and observing m^ ~cð Þ ¼ hS ~cð Þ implies that
v ¼ g1 /
P
c~c c
hS cð Þ
H
P
b>~b
lS bð Þ
L þ l^ð
~bÞ
L
0
@
1
A  X l^ð~bÞ=L
ðÞ
; /
ðþÞ
 !
; ðA:17Þ
where X l^ð~bÞ=L;/
 
is decreasing in l^ð~bÞ=L, and increasing in /. Next,
recall that l^ð~bÞ < lSð~bÞ implies wlð~bÞ ¼ w1l , i.e.,
x ¼ b
~b 1
a 1
g0 vð Þ
g vð Þ  vg0 vð Þ ; ðA:18Þ
according to (A.1). Combining (A.18) with x ¼ XðjÞ from (15) yields
the relationship
j ¼ X1 b
~b 1
a 1
g0 vð Þ
g vð Þ  vg0 vð Þ
 !
 Kð v
ðÞ
; a
ðþÞ
; b
ðÞ
Þ; ðA:19Þ
where Kðv; a; bÞ is decreasing in both v and b, and increasing in a. Now,
substituting l2 ¼ Pc~c cmS cð Þ
 
=g vð Þ into the numerator of (A.3) as
well as substituting both (A.4) and (A.5) into the denominator of (A.3)
yields
j ¼
/ 1 mH þ a1ð Þvg vð Þ
P
c~c c
hS cð Þ
H
h i
1þPb>~b bb 1ð Þ l
S bð Þ
L þ b~b 1
 
l^ð~bÞ
L
: ðA:20Þ
Observing (A.17) and (A.19) then leads to
0 ¼K X l^ð
~bÞ
L
;/
 !
; a; b
 !
1þ
X
b>~b
bb 1ð Þ l
S bð Þ
L
þ b~b 1
  l^ð~bÞ
L
2
4
3
5
/ 1 m
H
þ
a 1ð ÞX l^ð~bÞL ;/
 
g X l^ð
~bÞ
L ;/
  
X
c~c
c
hS cð Þ
H
2
4
3
5:
ðA:21Þ
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Note that m^ ~cð Þ ¼ hS ~cð Þ implies that m=H is constant, according to (A.6).
Thus, (A.21) gives us l^ð~bÞ=L implicitly as function of ða; b;/Þ. Hence,
observing the properties of functions X l^ð~bÞ=L;/
 
and Kðv; a; bÞ con-
ﬁrms the results regarding l^ð~bÞ=L.34
We now turn to wage inequality. First, note that combining
m^ ~cð Þ ¼ hS ~cð Þ and (A.10) implies l^ð~bÞ=L ¼ / Pc~c cmS cð Þ=H
 
=g vð Þ
P
b>~b l
S bð Þ=L. Substituting this expression into (A.20), and using
j ¼ Kðv; a; bÞ from (A.19), leads to
1 mH þ a1ð Þvg vð Þ
P
c~c c
hS cð Þ
H
1
/ þ b
~b1
g vð Þ
P
c~c c
hS cð Þ
H þ b/
P
b>~bðb ~bÞ l
S bð Þ
L
 K v; a; bð Þ ¼ 0: ðA:22Þ
Thus, (A.22) gives us v implicitly as function of ða; b;/Þ. Hence,
observing @Kðv; a; bÞ=@v < 0 reveals that v is a decreasing function of
/.35 (Moreover, it is easy to check that changes in a or b affect v in an
ambiguous way.) According to (A.18), this implies that x decreases with
/, while within-group wage inequality wm cð Þ=wh for all c  ~c increases
in /, according to (17).
Next, we conﬁrm that x decreases with a. First, suppose v is non-
increasing in a. In this case, j ¼ Kðv; a; bÞ is increasing in a because of
@Kðv; a; bÞ=@v < 0 and @Kðv; a; bÞ=@a > 0. Thus, since (15) implies
x ¼ XðjÞ with X0ðjÞ < 0, x is decreasing in a if v is non-increasing in a.
Now suppose to the contrary that v is increasing in a. In this case, (A.22)
imposes @j=@a > 0 and thus, @x=@a < 0, according to (15). In sum, we
have shown that whatever the sign of @v=@a is, @x=@a < 0.
In a similar fashion, we can show that @x=@b > 0. First, suppose v is
non-decreasing in b. In this case, j ¼ Kðv; a; bÞ is decreasing in b
because of @Kðv; a; bÞ=@v < 0 and @Kðv; a; bÞ=@b < 0. Thus, since
x ¼ XðjÞ with X0ðjÞ < 0, x is increasing in b if v is non-decreasing in b.
Now suppose to the contrary that v is decreasing in b. In this case, (A.22)
imposes @j=@b < 0 and thus, @x=@b > 0, according to (15). In sum, we
have shown that whatever the sign of @v=@b is, @x=@b > 0.
34 Note that v=g vð Þ is strictly increasing in v since g vð Þ  vg0 vð Þ > 0.
35 Note that this is no contradiction to (A.17) since l^ð~bÞ=L increases with / in
scenario 4.
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Finally, we show that wm cð Þ=wh is increasing in a for all c  ~c. To see
this, ﬁrst, solve (A.18) for ða 1Þ=g0 vð Þ and substitute the resulting
expression into (17) to obtain
wm cð Þ
wh
¼ cðb
~b 1Þ
x g vð Þ  vg0 vð Þ½  ; c  ~c: ðA:23Þ
Suppose that v is increasing in a. Then @x=@a < 0 and g00 vð Þ > 0
unambiguously imply that wm cð Þ=wh is increasing in a for all c  ~c,
according to (A.23). Now suppose to the contrary that v is non-increasing
in a. According to (17), also in this case wm cð Þ=wh is increasing in a for
all c  ~c. (The impact of an increase in b on inequality within the group
of Hworkers, however, is ambiguous, since its impact on v is ambig-
uous.) This concludes the proof. h
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